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PACIFIC INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
‘Pooled regional governance’ in the island
Pacific? Lessons from history
Greg Fry
Director of Graduate Studies in International Affairs, Department of International Relations,
The Australian National University
Since mid 2003 the Australian Government
has been attempting to reshape and revitalise
regional cooperation in the South Pacific
around the concept of ‘pooled regional
governance’. The notion was first promoted
by Prime Minister John Howard in the
context of announcing his government’s
intention to lead a regional assistance
mission to Solomon Islands.1 The Prime
Minister argued that the smaller Pacific states
needed to share resources if they were to
overcome the constraints imposed by their
small size and lack of capacity. He illustrated
the point by referring to the absurdity of each
island country trying to run its own airline
or train its police when these could be done
through a pooling of resources.
By August of 2003 ‘pooled regional
governance’ had become a major foreign
policy objective. Prime Minister Howard
vigorously promoted the concept at the
Pacific Islands Forum in Auckland. After his
discussions he claimed that other leaders
had accepted the notion (Howard 2003)
although the New Zealand press interpreted
these events slightly differently, viewing the
Australian push as too heavy handed. The
Forum agreed not only to action on the
particular cases the Prime Minister had
raised, that of a regional police training unit
and an Australian-sponsored study of civil
aviation, but also to a major overhaul of
regional arrangements under the auspices
of the Forum. In some senses the resultant
Pacific Plan became the embodiment of a
broader notion of ‘pooled regional
governance’, not just the sharing of resources
and saving of costs in particular sectors but
a commitment to a ratcheting-up of the
cooperative effort as implied in the term
‘regional governance’ as against ‘regional
cooperation’ (Eminent Persons’ Group 2004).
The Prime Minister also lobbied hard and
ultimately successfully to make sure that an
Australian would be in charge of the
development of the Pacific Plan.
As the concept is currently being
developed in the Pacific context certain things
have become clear about the parameters
within which the participating states envisage
future developments. No Pacific leader is
pressing for a Pacific Union along the lines of
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the European Union or a regional currency
(the Australian dollar) despite the publicity
given to these ideas following the release of
the recommendations of an Australian Senate
Committee on A Pacific Engaged just prior to
the Auckland Forum. Both the Australian
Government and leaders of Pacific island
states rejected such ideas as premature. But
all seem to be agreed on the need to go beyond
what is currently in existence either to deal
with globalisation, to promote regional
security (Australia) or to halt the development
of a ‘ghetto of conflict and poverty’ (New
Zealand).2 There also seems to be agreement
that this should be pursued under the
auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum.
But within these broad parameters there
is obviously ground for political contest over
the depth, breadth, form and purpose of
future regional governance and the shape of
institutional arrangements. These are of
course not new questions in a region where
regional governance in various forms has
been attempted for so long. As Fiji’s Foreign
Minister, Kaliopate Tavola, said when asked
about the new notion of pooled regional
governance in July 2003: ‘Well the concept is
not new, I mean, the name Prime Minister
John Howard has given it is new… But the
concept itself has been the basis of some of
the regional initiatives’.3
In its 34 years of history the Pacific
Islands Forum has provided a focal point for
several different models of regional
governance. It is the starting point for this
discussion that this experience provides
some useful insights into the issues awaiting
particular interpretations of the concept of
‘pooled regional governance’. While one
should recognise that there are new global
conditions and Pacific states are at a very
different stage of their political development
there are nevertheless lessons to be learnt
from this history. It is at the very least
important to remind some new
commentators that there is such a history.
The fact that Australian Governments have
made major attempts in the past to promote
precisely this same agenda is important.
Prime Minister, Paul Keating, for example
attempted in 1994 to create a new regional
economic order with ‘pooled regional
governance’ in all but name as the underlying
concept and, as now, with airline
rationalisation as a key policy objective (see
Fry 1994). This is not to mention the first
decade of the Forum’s history where a
narrow conception of ‘pooled regional
governance’—that concerned with regional
integration of sectors of the economy
including, most prominently, civil aviation—
was pursued as the main objective of
regional cooperation and failed. At the risk
of simplification, I divide this rich history of
regional cooperation in the Pacific into five
main forms of attempted regional governance
with a rough correlation with different time
periods in terms of their prominence.
Comprehensive regional
integration (1971–74)
The emphasis on regional economic
integration in the early years of the Forum
reflected the liberal economic and
development thinking of the time. It
proceeded on several simple premises which
seemed to have common sense status and
which bear a strong resemblance to the
rationale for ‘pooled regional governance’ as
promoted in the current context. They were
that larger units do better than smaller ones
(particularly very small ones); that
rationalisation of industry across the region
would maximise economies of scale or at
least reduce the diseconomies of scale that
would otherwise occur; that small countries
could not each afford a shipping line, a
university, an airline, and a development
bank; and that a free trade area would be
trade-creating for the region; and that cost-
113
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Feature
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 20 Number 3 2005 © Asia Pacific Press
cutting could be achieved through bulk
purchasing. These ideas were implicit in the
early proposals of the Forum, in the tasks
given by the first Forum to a committee on
trade which met in 1971, and in the tasks
given to the new South Pacific Bureau for
Economic Cooperation in its founding
agreement (South Pacific Forum 1971, 1972).
In the event, proposals for
comprehensive regional economic
integration—economic union, free trade area
and industrial rationalisation ideas—did not
pass initial inspection by consultants and
committees. They failed largely on the basis
of the supporting arguments as examined by
officials and consultants, rather than
because of political positions of member
countries in formal negotiations. Industrial
rationalisation was thought to be premature
when an industrial base did not exist in the
island countries except in Fiji. Inter-island
trade was minimal because their products
were either the same (for example, bananas)
or, where different, were not the type of
product that other island countries had the
capacity to process (for example, copper).
While a regional free trade area was judged
to benefit Fiji’s economic development it
would be damaging to the island economies.
Incorporation in a wider free trade area with
Australia and New Zealand was seen as
having similar implications.
Sectoral integration (1971–78)
While comprehensive economic integration
was effectively removed from the regional
agenda in the early years of the Forum’s
activities attention focussed instead on
sectoral integration, particularly in the areas
singled out later by Prime Minister John
Howard as in particular need of pooled
regional governance, that of education and
training, and civil aviation. Some prominent
regional institutions—the University of the
South Pacific and the carrier Air Pacific—
had already been created in these sectors in
the last years of the colonial period. They
became controversial in the 1970s as Pacific
island leaders outside Fiji began to question
whether these Fiji-based institutions were
adequately serving their interests.4
The idea of a regional airline, based on
an extension of the existing Fiji Airways, was
first developed in the late 1960s by the
British, Australian, New Zealand and Fiji
Governments. In 1968 the existing
shareholders in the consortium—Qantas, Air
New Zealand, BOAC and the Fiji
Government—were joined by the Western
Pacific High Commission on behalf the
British Solomon Islands Protectorate, the
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, and the
Kingdom of Tonga. In the following year
Western Samoa and Nauru because
shareholders and in 1971 Fiji Airways
changed its name to Air Pacific.5 By the early
1970s, however, it was evident that it was
only Fiji, among the island states, that was
keen to further develop Air Pacific as a
regional consortium. Despite their
shareholdings in Air Pacific, the
independent island countries were clearly
interested in developing their own national
airlines. Nauru had already established Air
Nauru in 1969 and Polynesian Airlines, with
the Western Samoa Government as major
shareholder, was set up in the same year. In
1972 Nauru formally withdrew from the
board of Air Pacific while retaining its
shareholding and in the following year the
King of Tonga announced his intention of
establishing a national airline and Air New
Guinea was established. The lack of
commitment of the other island states to the
development of Air Pacific was also
demonstrated in their reluctance to increase
their shareholdings as the metropolitan
airlines withdrew. As a result Fiji became
majority shareholder and the airline became
increasingly identified as a national carrier.
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After the Rarotonga Forum in March
1974, Ratu Mara had warned: the ‘Forum will
stand or fall on civil aviation… Civil aviation
will be the real test of Pacific regional
cooperation’6. Two months later Ratu Mara
was saying that ‘Civil aviation is a notable
failure’ (Mara 1974:13). The idea of a regional
carrier was effectively at an end. While
various proposals for cooperation among
national airlines, such as rationalisation of
air routes and cooperation on purchasing of
equipment would later be countenanced, full
sectoral integration in the civil aviation field
was effectively off the agenda until raised
again by Prime Minister Keating
(unsuccessfully) in 1994 and by Prime
Minister Howard in 2003.
It is worth recalling the main reasons for
the failure of this ambitious effort at pooled
regional governance of the kind recently
advanced by the Australian Government.
The principal reason was the perception by
island states that Air Pacific was dominated
by Fiji. It was Suva based; it had its origins in
Fiji; Fiji was the main shareholder; Fijians
gained most of the employment provided by
the airline; and, it was claimed, Fiji
subsidised internal airfares by setting fares
on certain regional routes higher than they
should be (Inder 1974). The bitterness that
this issue engendered was not felt only on
one side. It was clear that Fijian leaders, and
particularly Mara, took offence at the rising
complaints about Fijian dominance.
It is important to note that the failure of
the ‘one regional airline’ concept had
important spillover effects into other areas
of regional cooperation. The neo-
functionalist theory of regional integration
underpinning European integration
assumed spillover effects in a positive
direction; this however was a spillover effect
that threatened to take regional integration
in the other direction. This was the first major
issue causing division among the Pacific
island states. Although the negotiations were
conducted largely outside the Forum
meetings the experience significantly affected
the willingness of these states to cooperate
on other substantive issues within the Forum
in its early years.
By the end of the 1970s it was clear that
Pacific island states were wary of economic
integration schemes requiring high capital
outlay, centralisation in one island state, or
a sacrifice of national autonomy. The
University of the South Pacific and the Pacific
Forum Line were the only examples of a
significant degree of sectoral integration. The
University maintained its regional support
by decentralising the campus. New
campuses and units set up in Western
Samoa, Kiribati and Tonga and promised at
that time for Vanuatu, went some way to
placate regional concerns about the uneven
distribution of benefits (Crocombe and
Meleisea 1988). The Pacific Forum Line
succeeded because it did not involve high-
level integration. The ‘pooling’ concept,
involving an operating company that would
charter ships from member countries,
allowed an identifiable national component
in this regional scheme and kept capital
outlays to a minimum. In most areas of
cooperation the emphasis shifted to the
supplementation of national efforts through
shared expertise, information and
coordination rather than a more ambitious
level of sectoral integration.
The South Pacific states were fortunate
that they did not venture far down the path
of comprehensive or sectoral integration
common in other parts of the Third World at
this time. Had they done so the experience
would have likely poisoned any chance of
moving to the more workable forms of
cooperation they later achieved. Their
attempts at significant sectoral integration
in tertiary education and civil aviation
indicated the kinds of tensions that would
have pulled more ambitious regional
schemes apart. Regional management
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boards were not like corporation boards in
the private sector. They were composed of
representatives of national interest. The most
desirable outcome for ‘the region’ was not
necessarily the most desirable outcome for
individual states or the politicians running a
state. Despite the assumption of shared
smallness, isolation and product range which
has informed the dominant approaches to
regional development, there is in fact
considerable variation among Pacific island
states on each of these variables. These
differences quickly revealed a serious rift
between the centrally located, relatively large
and well-off Fiji and the other participating
states over the costs and benefits of sectoral
integration (Neemia 1986).
There was not only the issue of equity.
There was also the question of whether the
individual state could have a more cost-
effective result outside the regional scheme.
There were also political costs. For politicians
the visible national venture, however
irrational in terms of economic theory, was
far more likely to earn local support than the
regional venture. The recent ‘biscuit war’
between Vanuatu and Fiji with Vanuatu
banning Fiji biscuits due to the competition
posed to its local industry because of the
operation of a free trade area suggests that
this tendency is still present.
Collective diplomacy (1979–90)
In the 1980s Pacific regional cooperation
found its strength in the shift in emphasis
from regional integration, whether
comprehensive or sectoral, to collective
diplomacy. By collective diplomacy I simply
mean joint regional action aimed at
mediating, moderating or denying harmful
global influences on the region and to
maximise the benefits from positive
international influences. Whereas regional
integration looks inward, collective
diplomacy looks outward. It is nevertheless
a form of pooled regional governance in the
broad sense in that it seeks to reach a
compromise within the region in pursuit of
a joint foreign policy and trades on the
advantage of pooled diplomatic and
negotiation resources.
Collective diplomacy was already
evident right from the start of the Forum
alongside sectoral and comprehensive
integration as a major form of regional
governance. The Forum employed this
approach for example in relation to
negotiations with the European Community
over the Lomé Treaty. The Pacific Group, with
coordination provided by the South Pacific
Bureau of Economic Cooperation (SPEC),
successfully represented the interests of
Pacific island states. Also in relation to the
Law of the Sea negotiations during the 1970s,
they formed the Oceanic group which again
successfully represented the views of the
island states particularly in relation to the
rights of archipelagic countries.
Pacific collective diplomacy came of age
in the 1980s when regional integration as a
form of cooperation was on the wane (in the
Pacific and across the Third World). In
particular it was the success of the anti-
nuclear dumping campaign in turning
around Japan’s proposal to dump
radioactive wastes in the Marianas Trench
which first demonstrated the power of
collective action. This was followed by a
series of successful joint diplomatic
campaigns which altered the intended
behaviour of larger states: Japan on drift-
netting, Australia on its policy approach to
regional security, and the United States on
its position on Law of the Sea issues and on
chemical weapons incineration on Johnston
Island. While the Forum’s campaign to
support the decolonisation of New
Caledonia did not influence France’s explicit
policy toward that territory, the success in
gaining UN support on the re-inscription
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issue, despite French lobbying, demonstrated
what concerted diplomatic action could
achieve in international forums. It doubtless
contributed to the increased confidence that
was evident in later diplomatic campaigns,
most notably on the drift-netting dispute and
in the lobbying on environmental questions
prior to the Rio Conference.
Collective diplomacy was strengthened
by the institutional developments of the late
1980s: the reorganisation and enlarging of
the Forum Secretariat, the creation of a
separate agency for dealing with
environmental issues, and the acceptance of
a compromise in the long running battle over
whether there should be one regional
organisation or many organisations. The
compromise was to create a cooperative
network of organisations through the
establishment of the South Pacific
Organisations Coordinating Committee. The
decentralised, but coordinated, network of
regional agencies in place by the end of the
1980s provided focus and commitment in
particular issue areas—the environment,
fisheries—and allowed several island
capitals to enjoy the economic and status
benefits of hosting a regional institution, a
departure from the Suva and Noumea-
centred regionalism of the 1970s.
A significant outcome of collective
diplomacy has been the establishment of a
series of regional legal regimes which seek
to institutionalise the understandings
reached between island states and the
outside world. These include the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1985), the
Convention for the Protection of the Natural
Resources and Environment of the South
Pacific Region (1986), and the Convention
for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long
Driftnets in the South Pacific (1989).
Regional security community
(1984–89)
Alongside these collective diplomacy efforts
of the 1980s concerned with the regulation
of the impact of globalisation (broadly
defined) on the Pacific was an attempt at
another form of regional governance—the
attempt by Australia and New Zealand to
impose a regional security order. This was a
push by Canberra and Wellington to promote
a joint foreign policy orientation among
Pacific island states around the notion of the
‘strategic denial’ of Soviet influence in the
South Pacific. This was form of collective
diplomacy, of attempting a joint foreign policy
stance across the region vis á vis matters
related to the Cold War as interpreted in
Canberra and Wellington. The regional
governance in this case was however
explicitly hierarchical. The joint foreign
policy orientation expected of the island
states was different from the foreign policy
behaviour of Australia and New Zealand.
This is often represented as a successful
strategy by Australia and New Zealand on
behalf of the West which somehow kept the
Pacific states pro-west during the Cold War.
This is not the case. Pacific states were
anticommunist for their own reasons. This
attempt at hegemonic regional governance
ultimately failed. The hierarchy could not be
sustained. The Pacific leaders did not like
the second-class citizenship given to island
states in the strategic denial formula. They
could not understand why island states were
denied diplomatic, economic and cultural
contact with the Soviet Union when the
western powers, including Australia and
New Zealand, enjoyed these links. In 1985
Kiribati entered a fisheries agreement with
the Soviet Union. Vanuatu followed suit in
1986. By 1988 it had become clear to the
Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans,
that Australia’s past approaches to regional
security were no longer workable.
117
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Feature
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 20 Number 3 2005 © Asia Pacific Press
Recognising the effective challenge to existing
Australian  assumptions posed by the
concerted actions of island leaders he
announced a conceptual shift in policy to a
doctrine of ‘constructive commitment’
emphasising partnership rather than agency
for western interests, or Australian
hegemonic aspirations, which he saw as
dominating past approaches (Evans 1988).
Harmonisation of national
policies (1994–2003)
From 1994 there was a concerted effort by
the Australian and New Zealand
Governments to re-establish leadership in
regional governance around issues to do with
economic reform, national governance, and
small ‘s’ security—drug running, trans-
national crime, money laundering and tax
havens. While this new push initially
included attempts to promote a form of what
is now termed ‘pooled regional governance’
(in the form of rationalised airlines and bulk
purchasing) as well as new forms of collective
diplomacy in relation to gaining better prices
for tuna from distant water fishing nations
these were not taken up by the Pacific island
states. The form of regional governance that
began to dominate was what we might call
regional harmonisation of national laws,
regulations or policies. This was very different
from collective diplomacy and from regional
integration of a particular sector. Its focus was
initially on creating the conditions for
structural economic reform, and for neo-liberal
development based on open markets. Like the
regional security community this was
explicitly hegemonic regional governance.
This form of regional governance had its
origins in the Keating Government’s attempt
to create an Australian-led regional
economic order in the Pacific. As the 1994
Pacific Islands Forum approached the
Australian Minister for Pacific Island Affairs,
Gordon Bilney, stated that
it is our hope that we shall be able to
seize the moment to launch ourselves
with fresh determination, on the crucial
task of preparing our region for the
challenges of a new century (Bilney
1994).
Throughout the 1990s the structural
reform agenda for Pacific states was
managed regionally (Sutherland 2000). A
donor-led agenda emphasised a regional
harmonisation of national regulations and
practices concerning privatisation,
investment laws, lowering of tariffs,
accountability, output-based budgeting and
so on. This harmonisation of national
regulations and practices also began to cover
security-related issues such as customs,
drug-running, policing and money
laundering, particularly after September 11.
This form of regional governance was
often contested or quietly resisted by Pacific
island governments because it was seen as
insensitive to local cultural practices, or
involved political costs for local politicians,
or economic costs for particular groups in
society or because of the way it was imposed
by Australia. For their part Australia and
New Zealand became increasingly frustrated
with the slow pace of regional reform and
the lack of obligation on the part of those who
signed up to the regional standards to carry
out what they had agreed to. This is partly
responsible for the push for ‘pooled regional
governance’ from 2003.
Lessons from the past
Certain general points can be distilled from
the past experience with regional governance
in the Pacific which may hold lessons for
this current attempt to build ‘pooled regional
governance’ and regional integration. The
first is that in various ways the history of
regionalism in the South Pacific has always
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been about negotiating Pacific engagement
with globalisation, whether in the form of
global trade, investment, colonial control, or
the environmental impact or resource
exploitation by larger powers. Regional
governance has always had a two edged role
in this negotiation or mediation process. For
outside powers such as Australia and New
Zealand or for the international agencies it is
seen as a vehicle to promote these globalising
ideas and processes. For Pacific states it has
often been seen as a shield against such
processes or a way of moderating the impact
as in the multilateral treaties regulating the
rapacious activities of the larger powers.
Secondly, implicit in these various
attempts at creating regional governance
over the past 34 years is the creation of
particular notions of regional community.
The big lesson of this long history is that the
political authority of regional governance is
tied directly to the legitimacy, among Pacific
islanders, of the particular notion of regional
community that is being promoted.
As the main outside force attempting to
shape regional governance since the mid
1970s Australia has come up against this
legitimacy issue a number of times. As
Senator Evans found in his promotion of a
two-tier security community in the 1980s and
Prime Minister Keating and Minister Bilney
found in the 1994–95 period in attempting
to set up a new regional economic order what
looks like a successful new form of regional
governance is not sustainable if it fails to gain
legitimacy among Pacific states and peoples.
The lesson from those past failures is that
the problem lay partly in the hegemonic style
of Australia’s regional community-building
(exacerbated by its claim to shape a
community of which it was not a member),
and partly in what was being promoted as
the way the community should live.
The lessons concerning the legitimacy
issue in relation to past regional governance
does not solely revolve around a tension
between Australia and the Pacific islands. The
other major trend in this regard is the tension
between different groups of Pacific islanders
over their respective rights and terms of
participation in regional governance. The
regional project has been seen as illegitimate
because it has been too state-centric, too male
dominated, or dominated by larger countries,
and particularly Fiji. In general terms there
has been a tension between those who see the
need for an opening up of regional governance
to include civil society, sovereignty movements
and non-independent territories, and those
who support a state-centric regional
community seeing these civil society groups
as unrepresentative.
Among participating Pacific island
states the authority of regional governance
has partly depended on how they see their
gains and costs relative to other member
states. As we have seen the lesson is that this
becomes very obvious when regional
integration in particular sectors is attempted.
The early failure of the regional airline and
the underlying tensions between Fiji and the
other Pacific states was noted earlier. Even
the regional success story, the integration of
the university training sector in the
regionally governed University of the South
Pacific has some important lessons in this
regard. The trend is to an increasingly
decentralised university and to the creation
of new national universities. Distance,
relevance, and local economic and political
benefit are all factors in encouraging national
rather than regional institutions in these
areas of high sectoral integration.
The exact shape of regional governance
under the Pacific Plan is still under
negotiation. The lessons of the past suggest
that serious regional integration of the kind
attempted in civil aviation is probably not
going to gain the legitimacy it requires for
authoritative and sustainable governance.
Harmonisation of domestic policies as a form
of regional governance may also have the
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problems of legitimacy it experienced in the
1990s unless Australia and New Zealand
engage more fundamentally with Pacific
perspectives on the governance and security
issues they seek to influence.
Notes
1 Interview with the Prime Minister, 22 July
2003.
2 ‘The United States of the Pacific’, The Sydney
Morning Herald, 17 March 2004:12
3 ABC Online, AM, Fiji’s Foreign Minister Talks
about Pooled Regional Governance, 23 July
2003, http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/
2003/s908328.htm
4 The dissatisfaction with the University of the
South Pacific is examined in Crocombe and
Neemia (1983).
5 Based on author’s interview with Captain P.
Howson, former Chairman of Air Pacific,
Sydney, 19 July 1976.
6 ‘Forum co-op wanted, not a talking shop’,
Pacific Islands Monthly, June 1974:3.
References
Bilney, G., 1994. Australia’s relations with the
South Pacific—challenge and change’,
address to the Foreign Correspondents’
Association, Sydney, 15 June.
Crocombe, R. and Neemia, U., 1983. ‘Options
in university education for the Pacific
islands’, Pacific Perspective, 12(1):5–17.
Crocombe, R. and Meleisea, M., 1988.
‘Achievements, problems and prospects:
the future of university education in the
South Pacific’, in R. Crocombe and M.
Meleisea (eds), Pacific Universities:
achievements, problems and prospects,
Institute of Pacific Studies, University of
the South Pacific, Suva:359–71.
Evans, G., 1988. ‘Australia in the South
Pacific’, address to the Foreign
Correspondents’ Association, Sydney,
23 September.
Fry, G. 1994. ‘Climbing back onto the map?
The South Pacific Forum and the new
development orthodoxy’, Journal of
Pacific History , 29(3):64–72.
Howard, J., 2003. Transcript of the Prime
Minister, The Hon John Howard MP,
Doorstop Interview, Carlton Hotel,
Auckland, 15 August.
Inder, S., 1974. ‘Up front with the Editor’,
Pacific Islands Monthly, June:3.
Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, 1974. Regional
Cooperation in the South Pacific,
address delivered at the University of
Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby, May.
Neemia, U., 1986. Cooperation and Conflict:
costs, benefits and national interests in
Pacific regional cooperation, Institute of
Pacific Studies, University of the South
Pacific, Suva.
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (MFAT), 2004. ‘Pacific
Cooperation: Voices of the Region’, The
Eminent Persons’ Group Review of the
Pacific Islands Forum, MFAT,
Auckland.
South Pacific Forum, 1971. Final
Communiqué, Wellington, 5–7 August.
South Pacific Forum, 1972. Final
Communique, Canberra, 23–25
February.
Sutherland, W., 2000. ‘Global imperatives
and economic reform in the Pacific
island states’, Development and Change,
31(2):459–80.
This article is based on a paper presented
at the International Workshop on Pacific
Governance and Regional Integration,
held at The Australian National
University, Canberra from 8–9 June 2005.
The support of the Australian Agency for
International Development for this
workshop is gratefully acknowledged.
